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1 Introduction
Many economic situations arise in which several different principals contract with the same
agents sequentially. For example, Topel and Ward (1992) report that an average white male in
the USA holds ten different full-time jobs during his working life, seven of which during the first
ten years of his career. In the labor market context, firms’ hiring and remuneration decisions
depend to a large extent on the employment history and track record of a worker. Therefore,
workers’ incentives for effort are not only created directly through explicit incentive contracts
but also shaped by their career concerns. Good current performance will enhance the labor
market’s perception of their ability and increase future earnings, providing a strong motivation
for effort. However, during any contractual relationship the current employer acquires more
information about her workers than is directly available to potential future employers. In this
paper we show that such interaction between different principals has profound implications
for the design of optimal incentive contracts. We demonstrate how contracts allow a principal
to shape agents’ reputational incentives and prove that in our model a principal’s contracts
always distort information revelation to future principals about the performance of her agents.
Moreover, we show that this provides a new rationale for the optimality of relative performance
contracts.
The idea that career concerns can reduce the need for explicit incentives dates back to Fama
(1980) and was first formalized by Holmstro¨m (1982/99). Such models are typically cast in
terms of symmetric learning, where symmetrically informed firms try to infer the ability of
an agent from publicly observable measures of his past performance. Agents interfere with
the updating process by exerting effort to influence these performance measures. Ex ante,
the parties cannot internalize the impact of agents’ actions on reputation, either because no
formal compensation contracts can be written, or because of limited pre-commitment powers.
This prevents the dynamic incentive problem from simply collapsing to a static one.
Under symmetric learning the impact of current actions on future reputation, and thus the
strength of reputational incentives, can either increase or decrease with improved information.1
However, as pointed out above, a lot of economic situations are characterized by sequential
contracting where there is asymmetric learning. Waldman (1984) is an early example for
1Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) characterize the impact of different information systems on implicit
incentives for situations where explicit incentives are not possible. Meyer and Vickers (1997) show that better
information can either enhance or weaken incentives in environments where implicit incentives are comple-
mented by explicit incentives. Incentives from the reputation enhancing effect of effort can be outweighed by
disincentives arising from the ratchet effect.
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the impact of a firm’s actions on workers’ reputations. In his analysis, a firm learns about its
workers’ types during the first period of their employment and then decides on job assignments
for the second period. Outsiders can observe the job offer that a worker receives. Promotion
to a job that requires higher ability sends a favorable signal to the labor market and enhances
an agent’s reputation. Because outside options improve, the firm has to increase the worker’s
compensation to retain him. As a result, the firm sets the ability threshold for promotion too
high compared to the socially efficient level.2
Because of such strategic effects the distinction between asymmetric and symmetric learning
environments is particularly important when implicit incentives are complemented by explicit
incentives. If a principal acquires superior information about agents’ abilities then the explicit
compensation scheme provides agents with signals that affect their reputation, and therefore
interact with implicit incentives. Thus, the explicit incentive contract now has two functions,
which might conflict with each other. First, it is supposed to directly affect effort incentives
through monetary transfers. Second, it is supposed to indirectly affect effort by controlling
the flow of information to outsiders to create appropriate reputational incentives. The model
of Za´bojn´ık and Bernhardt (2001) illustrates this dual role of explicit incentives. A firm sets
up a tournament in which ex ante identical workers compete in human capital investments
and are subject to a permanent human capital shock. The promotion scheme ranks workers
by their realized human capital. Reputational incentives arise because the expected human
capital shock for a tournament winner is larger than that for the next highest in rank, etc.3
This raises the question about the optimal structure of incentive schemes and whether tour-
naments can indeed be optimal contracts in such a sequential contracting environment where
parties can only commit to spot contracts. The first step in answering this question is to design
a model that excludes all the non-reputation based reasons for the use of relative performance
contracts that the literature has identified. First, correlation between stochastic components
in the outputs of different agents can be used to insure risk-averse agents against common
performance shocks (e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981), Holmstro¨m (1982), Nalebuff and Stiglitz
(1983), Green and Stokey (1983), and Mookherjee (1984)).4 Second, relative performance con-
2Other models with asymmetric learning are Greenwald (1986), Ricart I Costa (1988), Bernhardt (1995), and
Waldman (1990). In Lazear (1986) both the incumbent employer and outsiders obtain signals about workers’
abilities.
3The analysis abstracts from the strategic impact of promotion that arises in Waldman (1984) by assuming
that the firm can commit to its promotion rule ex ante. See Waldman (2003) for a discussion of conflicts
between ex ante incentives and ex post optimal promotion rules, and the role of commitment.
4Meyer and Vickers (1997) show that this static insurance effect can be outweighed by the negative impact
on implicit incentives of the ratchet effect in a dynamic model with career concerns.
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tracts can help internalize production externalities (e.g., Itoh (1991)). Third, the principal can
use relative performance contracts to create proper incentives when agents can monitor each
others’ efforts (e.g., Ma (1988), Che and Yoo (2001), and Laffont and Rey (2001)). Fourth, if
agents with other-regarding preferences interact, the principal may find it optimal to design
relative performance schemes that exploit the dependence of an agent’s utility on other agents’
transfers to enhance incentives (e.g., Itoh (2004)). Finally, special features about the economic
environment may restrict the set of feasible contracts in such a way that tournaments become
optimal. For example, even if measures of absolute levels of performance are not available, it
may still be possible to make ordinal comparisons among workers (e.g., McLaughlin (1988)).
Malcomson (1984) argues that even though the principal might observe performance these
measures may not be verifiable by outsiders. Then tournaments can be the only credible way
of providing incentives (see also Bhattacharya (1983).)
The next step consists in defining the contract space. In some economic applications it is
reasonable to assume that the principal can only contract on variables that are publicly ob-
servable. In our companion paper (Koch and Peyrache 2003) we take this approach and the
principal’s decision to reveal performance variables directly impacts her contracting possibili-
ties. We show that it is then optimal for a principal not to disclose performance measures and
implement a tournament whenever there is much heterogeneity in experienced agents’ produc-
tivities, and therefore reputation matters a lot. In this paper we assume that the principal can
commit to contracts on output even though it is not publicly observable.5 We focus on the
more realistic case where a principal can only write deterministic contracts, since stochastic
contracts impose the strong requirement that a principal can commit to lotteries.
We model the contracting problem between a principal (’she’) and two heterogenous agents
(’he’). Let us call the agent endowed with a larger ability ’high skilled’ and the other ’low
skilled’. Both agents work for her during one period. In the second period, the agents contract
with other principals who draw inferences about agents’ abilities from the publicly observable
contracts and hard evidence on transfers that agents received in the first period. In the model,
observing an agent’s first-period output would reveal his ability and, therefore, would provide
a valuable signal for the high-skilled agent. Market inference relies on ’inverting’ the transfer
scheme to back out the output produced by an agent. As we show, the first principal can
profit from using the transfer scheme to pool performance-related signals for low- and high-
skilled agents in such a way that reputation increases with output. This provides agents with
reputational incentives and lowers the monetary cost of implementing effort.
5In other words, output is assumed to be verifiable by a third party (e.g., a court).
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Our main results obtain under the above assumptions alone. The subsequent analysis will
show that the monetary transfers given by the principal influence an agent’s reputation. Upon
observing such a transfer, the market forms expectations about the agent’s type. Moreover,
the principal can profit from complementing monetary transfers with cheap-talk messages since
this allows her to provide different agents who receive the same monetary transfer with distinct
signals to the market.6 Therefore, we additionally require contracts to be renegotiation proof
to guarantee that our findings do not rely on contracting parties to renegotiate or on agents
buying cheap-talk signals in equilibrium.
The first main result of the paper is that the principal always distorts the flow of information to
future principals. Second, we show that rank order tournaments can be optimal contracts when
they implement effort at no monetary cost, otherwise however, they are strictly dominated
by individual performance contracts. This complements the result on the optimality of rank
order tournaments in our companion paper (Koch and Peyrache 2003). However, in our setup
a simple group bonus scheme can strictly outperform any individual performance contract. In
fact, we prove that the principal can limit her search for optimal renegotiation proof incentive
schemes to the class of relative performance contracts that are non-trivial, in the sense that
they cannot be replicated by contracts based on individual performance only. This provides a
new rationale for the optimality of relative performance contracts in a setup where the extant
reasons for the optimality of such compensation schemes are absent.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 analyzes contracts
based on individual performance measures. Section 4 extends the analysis of the contracting
problem to the entire set of deterministic contracts. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the
appendix.
2 The Model
A principal (she) offers two agents (he) contracts to work for her during one period. It is
common knowledge that one of the agents is high-skilled (θ = H) and that the other one is
low-skilled (θ = L).7 Both agents’ working lives last for two periods and they have outside
options that provide them with a life-time utility normalized to u = 0. An agent who enters
6For example, the principal can write different types of reference letters or award the agents some symbolic
prizes. Technically, the role of such messages is to guarantee existence of an equilibrium.
7It is possible to introduce a stage where the principal selects agents from a heterogeneous population to
contract with. We refer the interested reader to our companion paper (Koch and Peyrache 2003), where we
consider this issue in a related context.
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into a contract with the principal for one period then faces new contracting opportunities with
other principals in the second period. All parties are risk neutral. Agents are subject to wealth
and credit constraints that prevent the principal from imposing negative transfers. Discount
rates are normalized to one.
We begin by describing the first-period production technology. An agent of type θ ∈ {L,H}
who works for the principal in the first period can achieve two possible type-dependent output
levels, a low one (qθl) and a high one (qθh). A high output level can only be reached if the
agent exerts effort (eθ = 1) at a private cost ψ. Formally,
Prob ( q˜ = qθh| eθ = 1) = Pθ, (1)
Prob ( q˜ = qθl| eθ = 0) = 0. (2)
Thus, both agents’ outputs depend only on their own effort and type.8 In addition, we assume
that the high-skilled agent has a larger productivity of effort than the low-skilled one. That
is,
PH > PL > 0. (3)
In sum, stochastic output accruing to the principal from an arbitrary agent can take on four
possible realizations q˜ ∈ Q ≡ {qLl, qLh, qHl, qHh}, where qLl < qLh 6= qHl < qHh.
Agents are initially privately informed about their own type. At the beginning of the first
period, the principal offers contracts to the two agents, who can accept or reject the contract
offered to them. If an agent accepts, he non-cooperatively chooses his effort level, which is not
observable by any other party.9 At the end of the first period, output realizes and agents are
paid according to their contracts.
We consider an environment where agents’ outputs are contractible but not publicly observ-
able.10 Contracts map agents’ outputs to transfer/message (t/m) pairs. These consist of a
monetary component t ∈ R+ and a message component11 m ∈ M , which both are hard evi-
dence. Allowing for such messages in our analysis provides the principal with the means to
make a distinction between agents who receive the same monetary transfers. At the end of the
first period, principal and agents can renegotiate about t/m pairs. This entails a cost that can
be arbitrarily small. If no renegotiation occurs, or no agreement is reached, the agent receives
the t/m pair guaranteed under the contract.
8This eliminates production externalities as a rationale for relative performance contracts.
9This rules out mutual monitoring as a rationale for relative performance contracts.
10This could be the case whenever a third party, such as a court, can verify performance even though it is not
publicly observable. Agents can sue the principal in the case of contract breach, and the court then imposes a
large penalty on the principal.
11Examples for such messages are reference letters, job titles, honorific rewards, and medals.
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In the second period, agents leave the first principal and face new contracting opportunities
with different principals. In our setup the utility that an agent derives from such a contractual
relationship is increasing in his expected type. To fix ideas, think of this as the reduced
form of a competitive market for experienced agents. Let kθ > 0 reflect an experienced
agent’s productivity, which can differ from that in the first period because of human capital
accumulated. Denote by ∆ k ≡ kH −kL > 0 the difference in productivities between high- and
low-skilled experienced agents. Each of the principals in the market for experienced agents
meets at most one of the two agents. They form beliefs about the agent’s type based on
the publicly observable first-period contracts and any piece of hard evidence that this agent
chooses to furnish, and then simultaneously offer him contracts. Agents can conceal the t/m
pair which they received in the first period or one component of it. In the following, we will
simply model these principals as a ’market’ that forms homogeneous beliefs about an agent
based on observed t/m pairs.
Let us briefly discuss the simplifying assumption that agents leave the first principal. We have
in mind markets where there are high rates of turnover, as for example in the professional
service industry where employee turnover can be as high as 20 to 25 percent of the workforce
per year (Maister (2003), p.15). Since separation is a joint decision of the principal and
the agent one could argue that the informational asymmetry between the first principal and
outsiders causes a ’lemons’ problem (Greenwald 1986). However, in a more realistic setting, an
agent’s productivity is determined both by ability and the match between the agent’s human
capital and the job that a principal can offer (e.g., Antel (1985) and McLaughlin (1991)). The
turnover pattern in our model would arise endogenously if the match between principal and
skills for experienced agents were always better in a different segment of the labor market,
regardless of agents’ ability levels. For example, productive abilities and resources under
control might be complements (Rosen 1982). Then, it is efficient for experienced agents to
move to a bigger firm if they all sufficiently enhanced their human capital through learning
by doing in the first period (while still differing in the attained productivity levels). Turning
to empirical studies, Gibbons and Katz (1991) do find an adverse selection effect for white
collar workers, which however is not apparent for workers with less than two years of tenure
(p.367) – the group that we have in mind in our model. Gibbs, Ierulli, and Milgrom (2002)
even report a positive effect on income ensuing a move to another firm. Moreover, both Baker,
Gibbs, and Holmstro¨m (1994) and Lazear and Oyer (2004) document substantial turnover at
all hierarchy levels of firms. Thus, adverse selection appears not to be a severe problem since
otherwise the market for experienced labor would break down (Greenwald 1986).
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To summarize, the timing of the model is as follows:
• At date 0, the first principal makes contract offers to the two agents.
• At date 1/3, agents can accept or refuse the offer. If an agent rejects he receives the
outside utility level u = 0. If he accepts he gets hired and the market observes the
contract.
• At date 1/2, agents who accepted the contract non-cooperatively choose their effort
levels.
• At date 2/3, output realizes. The principal and agents can renegotiate about trans-
fer/message pairs. The default t/m pair is the one guaranteed under the contract.
• At date 1, agents receive a t/m pair according to their contracts or the outcome of the
renegotiation with the principal, and the relation with the first principal ends.
• In the second period, agents who worked for the first principal enter the market for
experienced labor, where future employers meet at most one of the agents. Agents can
show employers their t/m pair or conceal one or both components of it. They get paid
their expected productivity given the hard evidence they provided.
The above model structure is common knowledge. We solve for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
and restrict attention to contracts that incite both agents to exert effort.12
3 Individual Performance Measure Contracts
We begin our analysis by focusing on contracts based on individual performance measures.
Definition 1 (Individual performance measure contract)
An individual performance measure (IPM) contract f ∈ ΦIPM is a function from the set of
outputs of one agent to the set of transfer-message pairs: f : Q→ R+ ×M .
Hence, the range of an IPM contract can encompass at most four distinct t/m pairs, each being
associated with one realization of the performance measure. To identify the output states in
which a t/m pair is given under an IPM contract, we use subscripts for the components of t/m
12A sufficient condition for this is that qLh − qLl ≥ 2ψPL . Then, even if there existed a contract that offered
sufficiently high reputational incentives to incite the high-skilled agent to exert effort at no monetary cost but
not the low-skilled one, it would pay to switch to a contract with no reputational incentives that implements
effort by both agents (cf. footnote 15).
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IPM Contract
Output (qθ s) qHh qLh qHl qLl
Label a b c d
f(qθ i) (ta,ma) (tb,mb) (tc,mc) (td,md)
Table 1: IPM contracts
pairs. These correspond to the letters assigned to the particular output states listed in Table
1. For example, ta denotes the monetary transfer associated with output state a, and tab is a
short-hand for ta = tb.
Upon meeting an agent who shows t/m pair (t,m) ∈ R+×M , the market forms beliefs about
the probability of facing a low-skilled individual: β : R+ ×M → [0, 1]. Given beliefs β, the
market’s expectation about the productivity of an agent with t/m pair (t,m) is:13
E[kθ|t,m] = β(t,m) kL + [1− β(t,m)] kH . (4)
One polar case are perfectly revealing t/m pairs which induce beliefs of facing either a high-
or a low-skilled agent with probability one:
Definition 2 (Perfectly revealing transfer-message pairs and contracts)
A transfer-message pair (t,m) ∈ R+ ×M is perfectly revealing if β(t,m) ∈ {0, 1}. A contract
is perfectly revealing if all of its t/m pairs are perfectly revealing.
Before describing the belief formation process, it is useful to understand how t/m pairs are
valued by an agent. Since t/m pairs (which are hard evidence) serve as a signal to the labor
market, their value to an agent does not only depend on their monetary component but also
on the reputation that they confer. This is captured by the concept of a perceived transfer. It
reflects the combination of the direct monetary value t and the reputation E[kθ|t,m] associated
with a t/m pair.
Definition 3 (Perceived transfer)
The perceived transfer for a transfer-message pair (t,m) ∈ R+ × M is given by T (t,m) =
t+ E [kθ| t,m].
To identify the set of t/m pairs that an agent receives under an IPM contract f ∈ ΦIPM , we
define the correspondence X as follows:
X(f) = {(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tc,mc), (td,md)} . (5)
13To avoid cumbersome notation, we do not index this expectation by the contract f .
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As a first step in describing the belief formation process, consider only the t/m pairs that
can arise on the equilibrium path with no renegotiation for a given contract f . Given the
market’s belief that both agents exert effort, the contract f ∈ ΦIPM induces a probability
distribution over the t/m pairs (t,m) ∈ X(f) for each agent. Denote the probability that the
market observes t/m pair (t,m) ∈ X(f) for an agent of type θ by α(t,m|θ, eL = 1, eH = 1). The
market forms its beliefs about the agent’s type according to Bayes’ rule. Thus, upon observing
a t/m pair (t,m) ∈ X(f), the probability assigned to the individual being low-skilled is
b(t,m) =
α(t,m|L, eL = 1, eH = 1)
α(t,m|L, eL = 1, eH = 1) + α(t,m|H, eL = 1, eH = 1) , (t,m) ∈ X(f). (6)
Off the equilibrium path, Bayes’ rule no longer applies and restrictions on beliefs have to be
imposed. A minimum requirement is that beliefs account for the possibility of agents hiding the
t/m pair that they received. One way of achieving this is to assume that the market considers
any agent who shows up empty handed to be low-skilled. The only other restriction that we
impose on out-of-equilibrium beliefs is that they support an equilibrium where contracts are
not renegotiated after output has realized.14 The following lemma states the conditions on
t/m pairs and beliefs required for renegotiation proofness:
Lemma 1 (Renegotiation proofness)
Suppose that both parties incur a positive (but possibly infinitesimally small) cost of renegoti-
ation. Given market beliefs β, a contract is renegotiation proof if ∀ (t′,m′) ∈ X(f) with t′ > 0
and ∀ (t′′,m′′) ∈ R+ ×M , for which (t′′,m′′) 6= (t′,m′), none of the following conditions is
violated:
(i) t′ > t′′ ⇒ t′ + E [kθ| t′,m′] > t′′ + E [kθ| t′′,m′′] ,
(ii) E [kθ| t′,m′] < E [kθ| t′′,m′′] ⇒ t′ < t′′ or t = 0 ∀ (t,m) ∈ X(f),
(iii) t′ = t′′ > 0 ⇒ E [kθ| t′,m′] = E [kθ| t′′,m′′] .
Condition (i) states that perceived transfers have to be strictly increasing in the monetary
component. Otherwise, the agent could renegotiate with the principal, offering her to replace
the contractually guaranteed t/m pair (t′,m′) by a pair (t′′,m′′) involving a lower monetary
transfer. The principal never renegotiates to a t/m pair with a higher monetary transfer
because agents cannot commit to repay her anything after having used the t/m pair as a
signal in the market. Conditions (ii) and (iii) guarantee that it is never profitable to buy a
message from the principal if the agent has cash. If t′ = 0, renegotiation is not possible because
the agent lacks the funds to bribe the principal into renegotiating to another t/m pair.
14For example, the simplest out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain contracts that are renegotiation-proof on
the equilibrium path, are: β(t,m) = 1 if (t,m) /∈ X(f).
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Note that the above conditions also guarantee that an agent never has an incentive to break
a t/m pair apart and conceal one or all of its components: under the conditions in Lemma
1 an agent is never willing to give up (or hide) a monetary transfer t > 0 in exchange for a
zero monetary transfer. Moreover, the perceived transfer can never decrease as a consequence
of revealing to the market a hard evidence message. If the agent receives t > 0 then his
reputation depends only on the monetary transfer (this follows from (iii)). If he receives t = 0
then he will be taken as a low-skilled agent if he shows up without any hard evidence message
(this follows from our assumption about beliefs when agents show up empty handed).
Equipped with the necessary concepts, we can now derive the incentive constraints for both
types of agents:
E [T (t,m)| θ = H, eL = 1, eH = 1]− ψ ≥ E [T (t,m)| θ = H, eL = 1, eH = 0] , (IC : H)
E [T (t,m)| θ = L, eL = 1, eH = 1]− ψ ≥ E [T (t,m)| θ = L, eL = 0, eH = 1] . (IC : L)
To decompose total incentives into monetary and reputational incentives, we rewrite the in-
centive constraint for the type θ agent with an IPM contract f ∈ ΦIPM as follows:15
t (qθh)− t (qθl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
monetary incentives
≥ ψ
Pθ
− [E [kθ| f (qθh)]− E [kθ| f (qθl)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
reputational incentives
. (7)
Our assumption on individuals’ productivities as experienced agents leads to a minimum
second-period wage of kL > 0. In conjunction with the wealth and credit constraints this
guarantees that agents’ always receive more than their outside option value u = 0. Thus,
agents’ individual rationality constraints are always satisfied.16
Best IPM Contracts
As a first step in our analysis, we restrict attention to IPM contracts only and derive opti-
mal contracts within this class of contracts (best IPM contracts). The following two rather
straightforward results already greatly reduce the set of candidate IPM contracts.
Lemma 2
Under any IPM contract, if a transfer/message pair that is given to an agent who has produced
low output is perfectly revealing, then the principal always sets the corresponding monetary
transfer equal to zero.
15From this we obtain the sufficient condition stated in footnote 12. The gain in expected output from making
the low-skilled agent exert effort is PL (qLh − qLl) and the expected cost of providing effort for both agents is
bounded above by 2ψ.
16The possibility of binding individual rationality constraints is analyzed in a related framework in our
companion paper (Koch and Peyrache 2003). We do not treat this case here since it does not add much
economic insight but greatly complicates expressions.
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Lemma 3
Under any IPM contract that gives agents the same transfer/message pairs in all low-output
states, the principal always sets the corresponding monetary transfer equal to zero.
Before proceeding to characterize optimal incentive schemes in the class of IPM contracts that
implement effort by both agents, we discuss a few examples to build some intuition about how
the principal can use t/m pairs to create reputational incentives.
As a benchmark, consider the solution to the traditional moral hazard contract with limited
liability, implemented as a perfectly revealing IPM contract. Beliefs are insensitive to an
agent’s output since E[kθ|f(qθh)] = E[kθ|f(qθl)]. Hence, the incentive constraint for the type
θ agent in (7) imposes the following condition on monetary transfers:
t(qθh)− t(qθl) ≥ ψ
Pθ
. (8)
Thus, the contract takes the following form:
[(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tc,mc), (td,md)] , where ta =
ψ
PH
, tb =
ψ
PL
, tc = td = 0, mc 6= md.
The principal has to rely exclusively on monetary incentives, yielding an expected implemen-
tation cost of 2ψ. The above contract helps illustrate the restrictions on the set of equilibria
that renegotiation proofness imposes. If ψPL + kL < kH an equilibrium where the benchmark
contract above is perfectly revealing cannot occur. By way of contradiction, suppose that
market beliefs are such that the contract is perfectly revealing. Then, a low-skilled agent who
is entitled to t/m pair (tb,mb) would renegotiate with the principal to obtain t/m pair (0,mc),
which yields a higher perceived transfer. Thus, the assumed beliefs are inconsistent.
From the preceding discussion two questions arise. First, can the principal benefit from not
revealing agents’ types through the t/m pairs she uses? Second, what role do the messages
play in doing so? We will explore these issues in turn.
Setting mcd = mc = md, i.e., not perfectly revealing the agents’ types in the low-output
states has two countervailing effects on incentives. Upon receiving t/m pair (0,mcd) the
expected productivity for the agent is kL < E[kθ|0,mcd] < kH . On the one hand, this creates
reputational incentives for the high-skilled agent because moving from the low-output state to
the (perfectly revealing) high-output state increases his reputation from E[kθ|0,mcd] to kH .
On the other hand, this leads to reputational disincentives because a low-skilled agent loses
in terms of reputation by moving from the low-output state to the high-output state. This
decreases his reputation from E[kθ|0,mcd] to kL. It can easily be shown that on balance the
principal benefits from setting mc = md, i.e., not revealing the agents’ types in the low-output
12
states.17 Thus, there is no real role for messages in this contract. However, the following
example illustrates when messages actually are useful as tools for distinguishing agents with
the same monetary transfers.
Consider altering the contract structure in the benchmark contract by pooling the t/m pairs
for a high-skilled agent in a low-output state and a low-skilled agent in a high-output state:
[(ta,ma), (tbc,mbc), (td,md)] , where td = 0.
This is an example of a contract with multiple performance standards that is not perfectly
revealing. Once the output of an agent surpasses a given performance standard, he receives a
different t/m pair. The contract is designed to group agents of different types in some tiers
of performances. Thereby, the principal affects the probabilities of meeting the thresholds
for the different types of agents, and controls how much information about agents’ types is
transmitted. In the above contract the performance standards create the following reputational
incentives: for the high-skilled agent,
E [kθ|ta,ma]− E [kθ|tbc,mbc] = kH − (1− PH) kH + PL kL1− PH + PL =
PL
1− PH + PL ∆ k, (9)
and for the low-skilled agent,
E [kθ|tbc,mbc]− E [kθ|td,md] = (1− PH) kH + PL kL1− PH + PL − kL =
1− PH
1− PH + PL ∆ k. (10)
On the one hand, these reputational incentives permit reducing some monetary transfers be-
cause of the effect on incentives captured by equation (7). On the other hand, pooling of
t/m pairs in states b and c forces the principal to pay the monetary transfer tbc also to a
high-skilled agent who is in a low-output state instead of nothing under a perfectly revealing
contract. A contracts’ total implementation cost is given by the sum of perceived transfers
that are required to implement effort by both agents. By pooling t/m pairs across states, the
principal increases the total implementation cost relative to the fully revealing benchmark con-
tract with expected cost 2ψ. In fact, this latter contract minimizes the total implementation
cost.18 However, what matters to the principal is the monetary cost of implementing effort.
In perfectly revealing contracts the total implementation cost is equal to the monetary imple-
mentation cost. Thus, if the reputational incentives that a non-revealing contract generates
17The first part of the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B shows this: the perfectly revealing IPM1 is
dominated by IPM5 which sets mc = md.
18The benchmark contract is the solution to the static moral hazard problem with limited liability. It
minimizes the expected monetary implementation cost in the static problem, which is equal to the total imple-
mentation cost in our setting.
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are larger than the increase in total implementation cost relative to the perfectly revealing
benchmark contract, the principal’s expected cost decreases below 2ψ.
Consider the situation where the reputational incentives are sufficiently large so that the
principal can incite agents to exert effort at no cost. This is the case here for ∆ kψ >
max
{
1+PL−PH
PL(1−PH) ,
1+PL−PH
PL PH
}
(see IPM4 in Appendix B). Then the principal sets ta = tbc =
td = 0. Now messages are useful because they allow the principal to distinguish the three
different output states. Using three distinct messages ma, mbc, and md she can maintain the
desired reputational incentives even though the transfer scheme is totally flat.19.
The previous examples illustrated the method for finding the best renegotiation proof IPM
contract. Checking the renegotiation proofness criteria of Lemma 1 and comparing the result-
ing profits of the candidate IPM contracts that implement effort by both agents yields the
following result:
Proposition 1
In the class of renegotiation proof individual performance measure (IPM) contracts where both
agents exert effort, the profit maximizing contracts (best IPM contracts) are non perfectly
revealing contracts with (multiple) performance standards.
Specifically, we show in the proof that the best IPM contract takes one of the following forms:
[(ta,ma), (tbc,mbc), (td,md)] (denoted IPM4), [(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tcd,mcd)] (denoted IPM5), or
[(tab,mab), (tcd,mcd)] (denoted IPM6). The above finding implies that the principal always
benefits from offering some form of non-revealing IPM contract that creates ambiguity about
agents’ types. This is reminiscent of Calzolari and Pavan (2002)’s model where optimal in-
formation transmission is always imperfect. In their sequential contracting model with pure
asymmetric information, either the first principal never discloses information (in the absence of
complementarities between the contractual relationships) or she partially discloses information.
Full disclosure would eliminate all information rents in the second contractual relationship.
In our model, full disclosure would eliminate all first-period reputational incentives. Strategic
information revelation permits the principal to shift part of the moral hazard cost to future
principals. Thus reputational incentives can be interpreted as an information rent accruing to
the first principal.
19Technically, the messages guarantees the existence of an equilibrium by serving as a means of distinguishing
two identical monetary transfers in terms of the reputation that they confer. Without messages one would need
to introduce a grid for such transfers to achieve existence of an equilibrium in a situation where monetary
transfers differ just to create distinct reputations.
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4 Individual versus Relative Performance Measure Contracts
This section extends the analysis to the complete set of deterministic contracts Φ. This set
can be partitioned into two subclasses, individual performance measure (IPM) contracts (the
focus of Section 3) and relative performance measure (RPM) contracts, which condition t/m
pairs on both agents’ outputs in a non-trivial way, i.e., they cannot be replicated by two IPM
contracts.
Definition 4 (Relative performance measure contract)
A relative performance measure (RPM) contract F ∈ ΦRPM is a mapping from the set of
outputs of both agents to the set of tuples of transfer-message pairs that cannot be replicated
using IPM contracts:20
F : Q×Q→ (R+ ×M)× (R+ ×M),
for which ∃ qθ′ s ∈ Q such that F (qθ′ s, qθ′′ l) 6= F (qθ′ s, qθ′′ h),
where s ∈ {l, h}, θ′, θ′′ ∈ {L,H}, and θ′ 6= θ′′.
Note that we have tailored the definition to our case where one agent is high-skilled and the
other is low-skilled. Thus, an RPM can be represented by a matrix that contains at most 16
distinct t/m pairs,21 corresponding to the possible combinations of output levels (see Table
2). A symmetric RPM contract ignores the identities of the agents and thus contains at most
eight distinct t/m pairs.
Let Fi(qi, qj) denote the t/m pair received by agent i ∈ {1, 2} under contract F . We extend
our previous definition of the correspondence X so that it identifies the set of t/m pairs that
any agent can receive under an IPM or an RPM contract:
X(φ) =

{(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tc,mc), (td,md)} φ ∈ ΦIPM ,(t,m) ∈ R+ ×M : ∃(q1, q2) ∈ Q×Q and ∃ i ∈ {1, 2}such that (t,m) = Fi(q1, q2)
 φ ∈ ΦRPM .
Similar to the case of IPM contracts, a given RPM contract F ∈ ΦRPM induces a probability
distribution over the t/m pairs (t,m) ∈ X(F ). This distribution determines the market’s
equilibrium beliefs about an agent who presents a t/m pair (t,m) ∈ X(F ). Hence, the incentive
constraint for the high-skilled agent, say this is agent 1, under an RPM contract F ∈ ΦIPM is
20In the contract proposal game, the principal needs to specify what happens if only one agent accepts the
contract. Since in equilibrium both agents accept the contract, to keep things simple, we do not include this
contingency in the definition of the contract. For example, the contract could stipulate to then apply the
perfectly revealing benchmark IPM contract from Section 3.
21Since in deterministic contracts different messages only can serve to distinguish between these cells.
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RPM Contract
Output of agent 2
Output of agent 1 qLl qLh qHl qHh
qHl (t1,m1), (t2,m2) (t3,m3), (t4,m4)
qHh (t5,m5), (t6,m6) (t7,m7), (t8,m8)
qLl (t
′
1,m
′
1), (t
′
2,m
′
2) (t
′
5,m
′
5), (t
′
6,m
′
6)
qLh (t
′
3,m
′
3), (t
′
4,m
′
4) (t
′
7,m
′
7), (t
′
8,m
′
8)
Symmetric RPM Contract
Output combinations qHl qHh
qLl (t1,m1), (t2,m2) (t3,m3), (t4,m4)
qLh (t5,m5), (t6,m6) (t7,m7), (t8,m8)
Table 2: RPM contracts
given by
[PL t (qHh, qLh) + (1− PL) t (qHh, qLl)]− [PL t (qHl, qLh) + (1− PL) t (qHl, qLl)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
monetary incentives
≥ ψPH−
{[
PLE [kθ|F1 (qHh, qLh)] + (1− PL) E [kθ|F1 (qHh, qLl)]
]
−
[
PLE [kθ|F1 (qHl, qLh)] + (1− PL) E [kθ|F1 (qHl, qLl)]
]}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reputational incentives
.
(11)
The low-skilled agent’s incentive constraint can be decomposed in a similar way. The same con-
ditions for renegotiation proofness as for IPM contracts apply to RPM contracts (see Lemma
1). As before, the wealth and credit constraints guarantee that agents’ individual rationality
constraints are always satisfied.
First, consider the polar case of perfectly revealing RPM contracts. These generate no reputa-
tional incentives in equilibrium so that all that matters to an agent is the expected monetary
reward received in each of the possible output states. Because the two agents are risk neu-
tral and their outputs are independent random variables, conditioning contracts on the other
agent’s output cannot decrease implementation cost. This is immediately apparent from a
comparison of the incentive constraints under perfectly revealing IPM contracts and RPM
contracts (cf. equations (7) and (11)). Hence, we obtain the following result:
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Lemma 4
Perfectly revealing relative performance measure contracts never have a (strictly) lower mone-
tary implementation cost than the least costly perfectly revealing individual performance mea-
sure contract.
From the literature we know that the principal can gain from relative performance measure
contracts if agents’ performances are correlated and agents are risk averse or if there is mutual
monitoring. Our model excluded these elements, and Lemma 4 confirms that RPM contracts
that do not create any reputational incentives cannot strictly dominate IPM contracts. As a
direct implication of Proposition 1 and Lemma 4 we obtain the following important result.
Proposition 2
Fully revealing contracts are not optimal.
This generalizes our earlier finding in Proposition 1 that the principal wants to design the
transfer scheme so that it creates ambiguity about agents’ types ex post. A corollary of
Proposition 1 is that the principal can never benefit from any randomization scheme that is
independent of agents’ types, i.e., that does not affect reputational incentives. This rules out
asymmetric RPM contracts:
Lemma 5
Asymmetric relative performance contracts, where agents are identified by randomly assigned
indices, never have a strictly lower monetary implementation cost than symmetric relative
performance contracts.
The previous results have narrowed the set of candidate contracts considerably: we are left
with the IPM contracts characterized in Proposition 1 and the class of non-revealing symmetric
RPM contracts.
Let us first consider rank order tournaments, which are a prominent example of RPM contracts.
Such a tournament selects the agent with the highest output as the winner, who then receives
the t/m pair (Be, “winner”), consisting of an explicit bonus Be ≥ 0 and a message announcing
the agent as the winner. The loser receives t/m pair (0, “loser”). In a setting where qHl > qLh
the high-skilled agent wins the tournament with certainty. That is, rank order tournaments
are then perfectly revealing contracts, and by Proposition 2 cannot strictly dominate IPM
contracts. In contrast, if qHl < qLh rank order tournaments create the following reputational
incentives:
E [kθ| (Be, “winner”)]− E [kθ| (0, “loser”)] = [1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k. (12)
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The combination of explicit bonus and reputational incentives generates a perceived bonus
B = Be+[1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k. Satisfying both agents’ incentive constraints22 requires that
B ≥ max
{
ψ
PLPH
, ψPL(1−PH)
}
. Since wealth constraints prevent the principal from imposing
negative transfers, the explicit bonus is
Be = max
{
max
{
ψ
PLPH
,
ψ
PL (1− PH)
}
−R (Be) , 0
}
. (13)
Clearly, rank order tournaments can be optimal contracts whenever the heterogeneity in ex-
perienced agents’ productivities, ∆ k, is sufficiently large. Then the principal obtains the
maximum possible expected profit since reputational incentives are sufficient to implement
effort and thus Be = 0. However, a rank order tournament can never strictly dominate IPM
contracts, as the next result states:
Proposition 3
Rank order tournaments cannot be strictly more profitable than individual performance measure
(IPM) contracts. IPM contracts strictly dominate rank order tournaments whenever the latter
require a strictly positive explicit bonus, Be, to provide incentives.
The proof consists in showing that at least one of the best IPM contracts identified in the
proof of Proposition 1 strictly dominates a rank order tournament whenever Be > 0. One of
the objectives of this paper was to answer the question whether tournaments can be optimal
contracts in a sequential contracting environment with asymmetric learning. Proposition 3
states that rank order tournaments can only be optimal contracts when they implement effort
at no monetary cost.23
Proposition 3 raises the question whether other RPM contracts can dominate IPM contracts.
Intuition would suggest that RPM contracts can at least achieve the same expected profit
as IPM contracts do since they provide the principal with more flexibility in designing t/m
pairs. Therefore, one could expect that by appropriately adjusting the monetary transfers the
principal can guarantee herself at least the same profit while leaving each agent with the same
expected payoff as under the best IPM contract. However, such reasoning applies only if the
best IPM contract involves some perfectly revealing t/m pairs (i.e., under IPM4 or IPM5).
Then it is indeed straightforward to construct an RPM that yields the same expected profit as
the IPM contract. Suppose IPM4 is the best IPM contract, i.e. the high-skilled agent receives
22Recall that the individual rationality constraint is always satisfied. A detailed derivation of the following
results is in Appendix D.
23In contrast, in our companion paper (Koch and Peyrache 2003) we show that rank order tournaments can
be uniquely optimal contracts if the principal can only contract on publicly observable information.
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a perfectly revealing t/m pair with monetary transfer ta in the high-output state. Let us
construct an RPM by setting t(qHh, qLh) = ta + η and t(qHh, qLl) = ta − αη, while leaving all
other transfers and messages as under the IPM. Obviously, the new transfers under the RPM
are perfectly revealing, just as ta. Therefore, the expected perceived transfer that the agent
receives in the high-output state is equal under both contracts if
PL η − (1− PL)αη = 0 ⇒ α = PL1− PL .
For such an η, the RPM ’perturbs’ the perfectly revealing monetary transfer of the IPM in
such a way that the expected perceived transfer for the agent and the expected profit of the
principal are equal under the RPM and the IPM.24 Therefore, whenever at least one of the
transfers of the optimal IPM contract is fully revealing, there always exists a symmetric RPM
contract that yields at least the same profit.
The above reasoning of ’perturbing’ transfers does not work if none of the transfers are perfectly
revealing (if IPM6 is the best IPM). In this case, making the transfer of one agent contingent
on the output of the other agent leads to a discrete change in the reputation attached to a
t/m pair. Total implementation cost and reputational incentives change in complex ways once
the composition of t/m pairs is altered, and the wealth constraints as well as the renegotiation
proofness conditions are considered. Therefore, it is far from obvious that a renegotiation-
proof RPM exists that can dominate this IPM contract. However, it turns out that such an
RPM does exist. Interestingly, a simple ’group bonus scheme’ which rewards both agents in
the same way when both produce high output and provides an individualized bonus to the
high achiever if only one agent produces high output dominates IPM6. This is shown in the
proof of Proposition 4. This directly implies the general result that the class of IPM contracts
is dominated by the class of non-revealing symmetric RPM contracts.
Proposition 4
Among the class of deterministic contracts which implement effort by all agents, non-revealing
symmetric relative performance measure (RPM) contracts generically dominate individual per-
formance measure (IPM) contracts. RPM contracts are strictly more profitable than IPM
contracts for a non-degenerate range of parameter values.
The result tells us that the complex contracting problem can be reduced to a search on the
subclass of non-revealing symmetric RPM contracts. This provides a new rationale for the
use of relative performance contracts since the assumptions in our model were chosen so that
24Renegotiation proofness of such an RPM is guaranteed generically as the proof of Proposition 4 shows.
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the known reasons for the use of such contracts are absent. In our setup the production
process of one agent is independent of that of the other. Nevertheless, since output contains
information on the agent’s ability it is optimal for the principal to tie the incentives of the
two agents together by pooling t/m pairs across different output states (Proposition 2). This
permits her to create ambiguity about the agent’s type since inverting the incentive scheme
does not allow the market to back out perfectly the output that the agent realized. Under
such a non-revealing contract the agent faces a lottery over future reputation that depends
on the output he produces. Specifically, the principal chooses a contract that partitions the
joint distribution of agents’ t/m pairs in such a way that, for at least one type of agent,
the reputation derived from using t/m pairs as a signal in the labor market is increasing
in the output that he produces. This gives rise to reputational incentives that permit the
principal to reduce monetary transfers whenever this does not create scope for renegotiation.
Ideally, the principal would want to write a stochastic contract to fine tune these lotteries
over perceived transfers. However, the principal might only be able to credibly commit to
deterministic incentive schemes (as in our setup) since in contrast to stochastic contracts these
are easy to verify by third parties such as courts. Then the principal can benefit from RPM
contracts because they provide her with more flexibility in creating lotteries over perceived
transfers. Even though agents’ wealth constraints and renegotiation proofness constrain these
choices, non-revealing symmetric RPM contracts can be shown to dominate IPM contracts
(Proposition 4).
5 Conclusion
The paper characterizes the class of optimal contracts in a sequential agency setting with
moral hazard. The first principal acquires information by observing agents’ outputs that is
not directly available to future principals. The latter form expectations about agents’ types
based on the first-period contract that they observe for an agent and any hard evidence from
the first agency relation that the agent is able or willing to show. The first-period contract
provides agents with such pieces of hard evidence through monetary transfers and cheap-talk
messages. We show that the first principal always distorts the flow of agent-related information
to future principals in order to sharpen incentives. Moreover, the first principal can limit her
search for optimal renegotiation proof incentive schemes to the class of symmetric relative
performance contracts that make each agent’s transfers a function of all agents’ performances
in a non-trivial way, in the sense that they cannot be replicated using individual performance
contracts only. This provides a new rationale for the use of relative performance contracts
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in an environment where the extant reasons for the optimality of such incentive schemes are
absent.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Consider an agent who is entitled to a t/m pair (t′,m′). Due to his wealth and credit con-
straints, if t′ = 0 he cannot directly compensate the principal for the cost that she incurs
by renegotiating to another t/m pair. Moreover, he cannot commit to pay the principal at
a later stage. Hence, all t/m pairs (0,m), m ∈ M, are renegotiation proof. If t′ > t′′, the
principal always renegotiates to t′′ since this decreases her cost. The agent accepts this offer
if the perceived transfer for the t/m pair (t′′,m′′) is larger than the one for (t′,m′), guar-
anteed by the contract. This yields condition (i). Suppose now that for some (t′′,m′′) we
have E [kθ| t′′,m′′] > E [kθ| t′,m′]. Then the agent may want to renegotiate to (t′′,m′′). The
principal agrees to this only if t′ > t′′, which is excluded by (i). If t′ < t′′, the agent can-
not commit to repay the principal part of a transfer after having used it as a signal in the
market. Hence, the principal refuses to renegotiate to any t/m pairs with higher monetary
transfer components. Finally, if the agent never receives any cash under the contract, i.e.,
t = 0 ∀(t,m) ∈ X(φ), he can never bribe the principal. This yields condition (ii). Suppose
now that there exists another t/m pair with an identical monetary transfer. If the perceived
transfer from this alternative t/m pair is larger than that from (t′,m′), and the market beliefs
are continuous in the monetary transfers in this point, then the agent can use part of t′ to
profitably bribe the principal into replacing m′ with m′′. This yields condition (iii).
B Individual Performance Measure Contracts
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider a positive monetary transfer for an agent of type θ who is in the low-output state.
Reducing this monetary transfer relaxes the agent’s incentive constraint and, therefore, the
principal can also reduce the expected monetary transfer to the agent in the high-output state
by the same amount. Since the t/m pair in the low-output state is perfectly revealing, this
modification in monetary transfers does not change the reputation effect of moving from low
to high output.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Decreasing the monetary transfer in low-output states has no impact on the reputation, but re-
laxes the agents’ incentive constraints. This makes it possible to reduce the monetary transfers
in the high-output states.
Proof of Proposition 1
We only consider contracts under which both types of agents exert effort. Thus, all contracts
ensure an expected output of:
qˆ ≡ qHl + PH (qHh − qHl) + qLl + PL (qLh − qLl). (14)
Using Lemmas 2 and 3 we can characterize all types of IPM contracts, and their respective
profits are given in Table 3 (the derivation of this table is in Appendix C). The proof below
consists in showing that one of the candidate contracts always dominates the other IPM
contracts.
1. IPM1 is strictly dominated by IPM5.
If IPM5 is not renegotiation proof, then IPM1 is not either. This stems from the fact
that 1PL <
2−PH−PL
PL(1−PL) ≡ C4 since
2−PH−PL
1−PL − 1 =
1−PH
1−PL > 0. Moreover, if
• ∆ kψ < min
{
C3,
1
PL
}
, then Π5 −Π1 = PH−PL2−PH−PL∆ k > 0.
• C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < 1PL , then Π5−Π1 = ψ−
PL(1−PH)
2−PH−PL∆ k > 0 since C4 ≡
2−PH−PL
PL(1−PL) >
1
PL
>
∆ k
ψ .
2. IPM2 is strictly dominated by IPM5 or IPM6.
(a) Suppose that IPM5 is renegotiation proof, i.e., ∆ kψ < C4. Given that C4− PH−PLPH PL =
PH (1−PH)+PL (1−PL)
PHPL(1−PL) > 0, the number of cases to consider are reduced. Then, if
• ∆ kψ < min
{
C3,
PH−PL
PHPL
}
, then Π5 −Π2 = PH−PLPL ψ − PH ∆ k +
PH−PL
2−PH−PL∆ k >
PH−PL
PL
ψ − PH ∆ k > 0, since ∆ kψ < PH−PLPHPL .
• C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < PH−PLPHPL < C4, then Π5 − Π2 =
PH
PL
ψ − 2PH−2PHPL+PL−P 2H2−PH−PL ∆ k.
Since ψ > PHPLPH−PL∆ k this is greater than
[
P 2H
PH−PL −
2PH−2PHPL+PL−P 2H
2−PH−PL
]
∆ k =
PL[PH(1−PL)+PL(1−PH)]
(PH−PL)(2−PH−PL) ∆ k > 0.
• PH−PLPHPL ≤ ∆ kψ < C3, then Π5 − Π2 = −
PH−PL
PH
ψ + PL∆ k + PH−PL2−PH−PL∆ k >
−PH−PLPH ψ + PL∆ k ≥ 0, since
PH−PL
PHPL
≤ ∆ kψ .
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Transfer/message pairs Profit
Perfectly revealing IPM contracts
1. [(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tc,mc), (td,md)] ΠIPM1 =
 qˆ − 2ψ if ∆ kψ ≤ 1PL ,not renegotiation proof otherwise.
IPM contracts with three distinct t/m pairs
2. [(tab,mab), (tc,mc), (td,md)] ΠIPM2 =
{
qˆ − PH+PLPH ψ − PL∆ k if ∆ kψ > PH−PLPHPL ,
qˆ − PH+PLPL ψ + PH ∆ k otherwise.
3. [(tad,mad), (tb,mb), (tc,mc)] ΠIPM3 = qˆ − 1+2PHPH ψ −∆ k.
4. [(ta,ma), (tbc,mbc), (td,md)] ΠIPM4 =

qˆ − 1+2PLPL ψ +∆ k
if PH ≤ 12 and ∆ kψ < C1,
or PH > 12 and
∆ k
ψ ≤ C2,
qˆ − ψ + PHPL1+PL−PH ∆ k if PH ≤ 12 and C1 ≤ ∆ kψ < C2,
not renegotiation proof if PH > 12 and C2 <
∆ k
ψ < C1,
qˆ if ∆ kψ ≥ max {C1, C2} ,
C1 ≡ 1+PL−PHPL(1−PH) , and C2 ≡ 1+PL−PHPL PH .
5. [(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tcd,mcd)] ΠIPM5 =

qˆ − 2ψ + PH−PL2−PH−PL ∆ k if ∆ kψ < C3,
qˆ − ψ − PL(1−PH)2−PH−PL ∆ k if C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < C4,
not renegotiation proof otherwise,
C3 ≡ 2−PH−PLPH(1−PL) and C4 ≡ 2−PH−PLPL(1−PL) .
IPM contracts with two distinct t/m pairs
6. [(tab,mab), (tcd,mcd)] ΠIPM6 =
{
qˆ − PL+PHPL ψ + PH−PL2−PH−PL ∆ k if ∆ kψ < C5,
qˆ otherwise,
C5 ≡ (PH+PL)(2−PH−PL)PL(PH−PL) .
Table 3: IPM contracts for which both agents exert effort
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• max
{
C3,
PH−PL
PHPL
}
≤ ∆ kψ < C4, then Π5−Π2 = PLPH ψ+PL∆ k−
PL(1−PH)
2−PH−PL∆ k =
PL
PH
ψ + PL(1−PL)2−PH−PL∆ k > 0.
(b) Suppose now that IPM5 is not renegotiation proof, i.e., ∆ kψ ≥ C4, then if
• C4 ≤ ∆ kψ < C5, then Π6 − Π2 = − (PH−PL)(PL+PH)PL PH ψ +
PH−PL
2−PH−PL∆ k + PL∆ k.
Since ψ ≤ 1C4 ∆ k =
PL (1−PL)
2−PH−PL ∆ k this expression is greater or equal to[
− (1−PL)(PH−PL)(PL+PH)PH (2−PH−PL) +
PH−PL
2−PH−PL + PL
]
∆ k = PL (1−PL)(PL+PH)PH (2−PH−PL) > 0.
• C5 ≤ ∆ kψ , then Π6 −Π2 = PH+PLPH ψ + PL∆ k > 0.
3. IPM3 is strictly dominated by IPM5 or by IPM6.
(a) Suppose IPM5 is renegotiation proof, i.e., ∆ kψ < C4, then if
• ∆ kψ < C3, then Π5 −Π3 = ψPH +∆ k +
PH−PL
2−PH−PL∆ k > 0.
• C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < C4, then Π5 −Π3 = 1+PHPH ψ +
(2−PH) (1−PL)
2−PH−PL ∆ k > 0.
(b) Suppose now that IPM5 is not renegotiation proof, i.e., ∆ kψ ≥ C4 :
• C4 ≤ ∆ kψ < C5. Then Π6 − Π3 =
PL+PHPL−P 2H
PHPL
ψ + 2 (1−PL)2−PH−PL∆ k > −
PH
PL
ψ +
2 (1−PL)
2−PH−PL∆ k. Since ψ ≤ ∆ kC4 =
PL (1−PL)
2−PH−PL ∆ k this expression is greater or equal
to (2−PH) (1−PL)2−PH−PL ∆ k > 0.
• C5 ≤ ∆ kψ . Then Π6 −Π3 = 1+2PHPH ψ +∆ k > 0.
Hence, only IPM5, IPM6, or IPM4 can be optimal in the class of individual performance
measure contracts. Each of these contracts can be shown not to be always dominated by one
of the other two candidate contracts:
1. Looking at the profits of IPM contracts in Table 3, it is obvious that IPM4 is optimal
whenever ∆ kψ ≥ max {C1, C2} and that IPM6 is optimal whenever ∆ kψ ≥ C5. For exam-
ple, fix PL = 0.4, then max {C1, C2} < C5 for PH < 0.76 and IPM4 is uniquely optimal
among IPM contracts for values of ∆ kψ between these thresholds.
2. Similarly, IPM6 can be uniquely optimal since the above inequality is reversed for larger
values of PH .
3. Finally, IPM5 is the best IPM contract for PH > 12 and C2 <
∆ k
ψ < min{C1, C4}:25
• IPM5 strictly dominates IPM6 for ∆ kψ < C4. First, recall that C4 > C3 and note
that C5 − C4 = (2−PH−PL)
2
(PH−PL)(1−PL) > 0. Hence, there are only two cases to consider:
25This interval is non-degenerate. One can easily see that for PH >
1
2
we have C1 > C2 and C4 − C2 =
[(2PH − 1) (1−PL)− (PH −PL) (PH +PL − 1)]/[PH PL (1−PL)] > (2PH − 1) (1−PH)/[PH PL (1−PL)] > 0.
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– ∆ kψ < C4, then ΠIPM5 −ΠIPM6 = PH−PLPL ψ > 0.
– C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < C4, then ΠIPM5 − ΠIPM6 = PHPL ψ −
PH(1−PL)
2−PH−PL ∆ k > 0, since
∆ k
ψ < C4 ≡ 2−PH−PLPL(1−PL) .
• IPM4 is not renegotiation proof for PH > 12 and C2 < ∆ kψ < C1.
C Individual performance measure contracts
We characterize here the generic types of IPM contracts that can arise and derive their profits,
which are summarized in Table 3.
Perfectly revealing IPM contracts
IPM1 : [(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tc,mc), (td,md)]
IPM contracts with four distinct t/m pairs are perfectly revealing. Applying Lemma 2, the
monetary transfers in the low-output states are zero. This corresponds to the traditional moral
hazard contract, implemented as a perfectly revealing contract, discussed in Section 3. It has
expected profit
Π1 =
 qˆ − 2ψ if ∆ kψ ≤ 1PL ,not renegotiation proof otherwise. (15)
IPM contracts with three distinct t/m pairs
IPM2 : [(tab,mab), (tc,mc), (td,md)]
The t/m pairs in states c and d are perfectly revealing and, therefore, it follows from Lemma
2 that tc = td = 0. Moreover, E [kθ| tab,mab] = PH kH+PL kLPH+PL . The respective incentive con-
straints are
PH [tab + E [kθ| tab,mab]] + (1− PH) kH − ψ ≥ kH , (IC : H)
PL [tab + E [kθ| tab,mab]] + (1− PL) kL − ψ ≥ kL. (IC : L)
Depending on which constraint binds, tab = max
{
ψ
PH
+ PLPH+PL ∆ k,
ψ
PL
− PHPH+PL ∆ k
}
. If
∆ k
ψ >
PH−PL
PHPL
the binding constraint is (IC : H). Applying Lemma 1, the contract is renego-
tiation proof since tab + E [kθ| tab,mab] = ψPH + kH > kH . Otherwise, (IC : L) is the binding
constraint. Renegotiation proofness requires that tab+E [kθ| tab,mab] = ψPL + kL > kH , which
is equivalent to ∆ kψ <
1
PL
. Since ∆ kψ ≤ PH−PLPHPL < 1PL , the contract is renegotiation proof.
IPM2 yields expected profit
Π2 =
 qˆ −
PH+PL
PH
ψ − PL∆ k if ∆ kψ > PH−PLPHPL ,
qˆ − PH+PLPL ψ + PH ∆ k otherwise.
(16)
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IPM : [(tac,mac), (tb,mb), (td,md)]
Under such a contract only the low-skilled agent exerts effort.
IPM3 : [(tad,mad), (tb,mb), (tc,mc)]
Lemma 2 implies that tc = 0; E [kθ| tad,mad] = PH kH+(1−PL) kL1+PH−PL . The respective incentive
constraints are:
PH [tad + E [kθ| tad,mad]] + (1− PH) kH − ψ ≥ kH , (IC : H)
PL [tb + kL] + (1− PL) [tad + E [kθ| tad,mad]]− ψ ≥ tad + E [kθ| tad,mad] . (IC : L)
Hence, transfers are tad =
ψ
PH
+ 1−PL1+PH−PL ∆ k and tb = tad +
ψ
PL
+ PH1+PH−PL ∆ k. Note,
tad +E [kθ|Tad] = ψPH + kH > kH and tb + kL =
PL+PH
PLPH
ψ + kH > kH . Moreover, tb > tad and
tb + kL > tad +E [kθ| tad,mad]. Hence, the renegotiation proofness conditions of Lemma 1 are
satisfied. The expected profit is:
Π3 = qˆ − 1 + 2PH
PH
ψ −∆ k. (17)
IPM4 : [(ta,ma), (tbc,mbc), (td,md)]
Lemma 2 implies that td = 0; E [kθ| tbc,mbc] = (1−PH) kH+PL kL1+PL−PH . The respective incentive
constraints are:
PH [ta + kH ] + (1− PH) [tbc + E [kθ| tbc,mbc]]− ψ ≥ tbc + E [kθ| tbc,mbc] , (IC : H)
PL [tbc + E [kθ| tbc,mbc]] + (1− PL) kL − ψ ≥ kL. (IC : L)
Since monetary transfers have to be nonnegative, the conditions on the transfers are:
tbc ≥ max
{
ψ
PL
− (1− PH)
1 + PL − PH ∆ k, 0
}
, (18)
ta ≥ max
{
tbc +
ψ
PH
− PL
1 + PL − PH ∆ k, 0
}
. (19)
Thus,
tbc =

ψ
PL
− (1−PH)1+PL−PH ∆ k if ∆ kψ <
1+PL−PH
PL(1−PH) ,
0 otherwise.
(20)
In addition to being nonnegative, ta has to satisfy condition (19).
Suppose first, that PH ≤ 12 , then
ta =

ψ
PH
− PL1+PL−PH ∆ k if
1+PL−PH
PL(1−PH) <
∆ k
ψ <
1+PL−PH
PHPL
,
PH+PL
PLPH
ψ −∆ k if ∆ kψ ≤ 1+PL−PHPL(1−PH) ,
0 otherwise.
(21)
The first line uses the fact that for PH < 12 we have (threshold for tbc > 0)
1+PL−PH
PL(1−PH) <
(PH+PL)
PLPH
(threshold for ta > 0). For PH ≤ 12 the contract satisfies the renegotiation proofness criteria
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of Lemma 1: if tbc > 0 then ta > tbc. Also, for ta > 0 we then obviously have ta + kH >
tbc + E [kθ|tbc,mbc].
Suppose now, that PH > 12 , then
ta =

PH+PL
PLPH
ψ −∆ k if ∆ kψ < PH+PLPHPL ,
0 otherwise.
(22)
For ∆ kψ ≤ 1+PL−PHPLPH we have ta ≥ tbc so that ta+kH > tbc+E [kθ|tbc,mbc]. Now, if
1+PL−PH
PHPL
<
∆ k
ψ <
1+PL−PH
PL(1−PH) , we have tbc > ta. For this range of parameter values IPM4 is not renegotiation
proof: renegotiation proofness would require that tbc + E [kθ|tbc,mbc] > ta + kH ⇔ tbc − ta >
PL∆ k
1+PH−PL . For the range
PH+PL
PL PH
> ∆ kψ >
1+PH−PL
PL PH
we have tbc − ta = PL∆ k1+PH−PL −
ψ
PH
. For
the range 1+PH−PLPL(1−PH) >
∆ k
ψ ≥ PH+PLPL PH we have tbc − ta = tbc =
ψ
PL
− (1−PH)1+PL−PH ∆ k. But
tbc − PL∆ k1+PH−PL =
ψ
PL
−∆ k < 0, since ∆ kψ ≥ PH+PLPL PH > 1PL .
Hence, the expected profit is:
Π4 =

qˆ − 1+2PLPL ψ +∆ k
if PH ≤ 12 and ∆ kψ < C1,
or PH > 12 and
∆ k
ψ ≤ C2,
qˆ − ψ + PHPL1+PL−PH ∆ k if PH ≤ 12 and C1 ≤ ∆ kψ < C2,
not renegotiation proof if PH > 12 and C2 <
∆ k
ψ < C1,
qˆ if ∆ kψ ≥ max {C1, C2} ,
(23)
where C1 ≡ 1+PL−PHPL(1−PH) , and C2 ≡
1+PL−PH
PL PH
.
IPM : [(ta,ma), (tbd,mbd), (tc,mc)]
Under such a contract only the high-skilled agent exerts effort.
IPM5 : [(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tcd,mcd)]
Lemma 3 implies that tcd = 0. Moreover, E [kθ| tcd,mcd] = (1−PH) kH+(1−PL) kL2−PH−PL . The respective
incentive constraints are:
PH [ta + kH ] + (1− PH) E [kθ| tcd,mcd]− ψ ≥ E [kθ| tcd,mcd] , (IC : H)
PL [tb + kL] + (1− PL) E [kθ| tcd,mcd]− ψ ≥ E [kθ| tcd,mcd] . (IC : L)
Since monetary transfers have to be nonnegative, the transfers are:
ta =

ψ
PH
− 1−PL2−PH−PL ∆ k if ∆ kψ <
2−PH−PL
PH(1−PL) ,
0 otherwise,
(24)
tb =
ψ
PL
+
1− PH
2− PH − PL ∆ k. (25)
If ta > 0 we always have tb + kL > ta + kH . In contrast, if ta = 0, we obtain tb + kL > kH
only if ∆ kψ <
2−PH−PL
PL(1−PL) (which is greater than the threshold for ta = 0). Thus, the conditions
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of Lemma 1 are satisfied if and only if ∆ kψ <
2−PH−PL
PL(1−PL) . Hence, the expected profit is:
Π5 =

qˆ − 2ψ + PH−PL2−PH−PL ∆ k if ∆ kψ < C3,
qˆ − ψ − PL(1−PH)2−PH−PL ∆ k if C3 ≤ ∆ kψ < C4,
not renegotiation proof otherwise,
(26)
where C3 ≡ 2−PH−PLPH(1−PL) and C4 ≡
2−PH−PL
PL(1−PL) .
IPM contracts with two distinct t/m pairs
IPM6 : [(tab,mab), (tcd,mcd)]
Lemma 3 implies tcd = 0. Moreover, E [kθ| tab,mab] = PH kH+PL kLPH+PL and E [kθ| tcd,mcd] =
(1−PH) kH+(1−PL) kL
2−PH−PL . The respective incentive constraints are:
PH [tab + E [kθ| tab,mab]] + (1− PH) E [kθ| tcd,mcd]− ψ ≥ E [kθ| tcd,mcd] , (IC : H)
PL [tab + E [kθ| tab,mab]] + (1− PL) E [kθ| tcd,mcd]− ψ ≥ E [kθ| tcd,mcd] . (IC : L)
To satisfy the wealth and incentive constraints,
tab =

ψ
PL
− PH−PL(PH+PL)(2−PH−PL) ∆ k if
∆ k
ψ <
(PH+PL)(2−PH−PL)
PL(PH−PL) ,
0 otherwise.
(27)
Note that the renegotiation proofness conditions from Lemma 1 are satisfied since tab +
E [kθ| tab,mab]− E [kθ| tcd,mcd] = ψPL > 0. Hence, the expected profit is:
Π6 =
 qˆ −
PL+PH
PL
ψ + PH−PL2−PH−PL ∆ k if
∆ k
ψ < C5,
qˆ otherwise,
(28)
where C5 ≡ (PH+PL)(2−PH−PL)PL(PH−PL) .
IPM : [(tabc,mabc), (td,md)] and [(tacd,macd), (tb,mb)]
Under such a contract only the low-skilled agent exerts effort.
IPM : [(tabd,mabd), (tc,mc)] and [(ta,ma), (tbcd,mbcd)]
Under such a contract only the high-skilled agent exerts effort.
IPM : [(tad,mad), (tbc,mbc)]
Under such a contract only one of the two types of agents exerts effort, depending on which
of the two incentive constraints binds.
IPM : [(tac,mac), (tbd,mbd)]
Under such a contract none of the agents has an incentive to work.
IPM contracts with a unique t/m pair
Under such a contract none of the agents has an incentive to work.
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D Rank Order Tournaments
This section provides the details for the analysis of rank order tournaments in Section 4. If
qHl < qLh rank order tournaments create reputational incentives, as will be demonstrated.
Reputation Effects
The market observes the explicit bonus Be that the principal sets as well as the tournament
outcome. Suppose that the market’s belief is that the explicit bonus Be implements effort by
all agents. Then the winner of the tournament is more likely to be high-skilled and the loser
is more likely to be low-skilled, and the market’s expectations about productivities are:
E [kθ|Be11, winner] = [PH + (1− PL) (1− PH)] kH + PL (1− PH) kL, (29)
E [kθ|Be, loser] = [PH + (1− PL) (1− PH)] kL + PL (1− PH) kH . (30)
The winner receives a higher wage in the second period than the loser. Hence, the reputation
gain of winning is:
R (Be) ≡ E [kθ|winner,Be]− E [kθ| loser,Be]
= [1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k. (31)
The winner’s perceived bonus B is the sum of the explicit bonus paid by the principal and the
reputation effect of winning the tournament: B = Be +R (Be).
Incentive constraints
When both agents exert effort, the high-skilled agent has the highest performance and wins
the tournament if he is in the high-output state (qHh > qLh > qLl) or if both agents are in the
low-output state (qHl > qLl). Otherwise the low-skilled agent wins the tournament. Thus, to
incite both agents to exert effort requires meeting the following incentive constraints for the
respective agents:
[PH + (1− PH) (1− PL)] B − ψ ≥ (1− PL) B
⇔ B ≥ ψPLPH , (IC : TH)
PL (1− PH) B − ψ ≥ 0
⇔ B ≥ ψPL(1−PH) . (IC : TL)
To satisfy both agents’ incentive constraints26 requires that the perceived bonus has to satisfy
B ≥ max
{
ψ
PLPH
, ψPL(1−PH)
}
.
26Recall that the individual rationality constraints are always satisfied.
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Equilibrium
Combining the above results now allows us to pin down the equilibrium wage and explicit
bonus such that all agents exert effort and the market has consistent beliefs. Since wealth
constraints prevent the principal from imposing negative transfers, she sets
Be = max
{
max
{
ψ
PLPH
,
ψ
PL (1− PH)
}
−R (Be) , 0
}
. (32)
Denote by qˆ the expected output when both agents exert effort (see (??)). Under a rank order
tournament that implements effort by all worker types, the principal has expected profit
ΠT =

qˆ − ψPLPH + [1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k if PH ≤ 12 and ∆ kψ < TC1,
qˆ − ψPL(1−PH) + [1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k if PH >
1
2 and
∆ k
ψ < TC2,
qˆ if ∆ kψ ≥ max {TC1, TC2} ,
(33)
where TC1 ≡ 1PLPH [1−2PL(1−PH)] , and TC2 ≡
1
PL(1−PH) [1−2PL(1−PH)] .
E Proof of Proposition 3
The expected profit under a rank order tournament (T ) is given by
ΠT =

qˆ − ψPLPH + [1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k if PH ≤ 12 and ∆ kψ < TC1,
qˆ − ψPL(1−PH) + [1− 2PL (1− PH)]∆ k if PH >
1
2 and
∆ k
ψ < TC2,
qˆ if ∆ kψ ≥ max {TC1, TC2} ,
(34)
where TC1 ≡ 1PLPH [1−2PL(1−PH)] , and TC2 ≡
1
PL(1−PH) [1−2PL(1−PH)] .
1. IMP4 dominates T whenever it is renegotiation proof
First, consider PH ≤ 12 . Note that then TC1 = max{TC1, TC2} and C2 = max{C1, C2}. Since
TC1 − C2 = PH − PL + 2PL (1− PH) (1 + PL − PH)
PL PH [1− 2PL (1− PH)] > 0 (35)
we have that ΠT = qˆ ⇒ ΠIPM4 = qˆ. Thus, what remains to be considered are the cases:
• C1 ≤ ∆ kψ < C2. Then ΠIPM4 − ΠT = 1−PH (1+2PL)PL PH ψ + 2PL (1 − PH)∆ k > 0 since
1− PH (1 + 2PL) > 1− PH (1 + 2PH) ≥ 0 and PH ≤ 12 .
• C1 ≤ ∆ kψ < C2 (< TC1). Then ΠIPM4 −ΠT > 0 if
∆ k
ψ
< C2
1− PL PH
(1− PH) {1 + PL [1− 2 (1 + PL − PH)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
. (36)
This condition is satisfied since the right-hand side (RHS) is larger than C2.
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Now consider PH > 12 . Then, TC2 − C1 > 0 and we again have that ΠT = qˆ ⇒ ΠIPM4 = qˆ.
Thus, what remains to be considered are the cases:
• ∆ kψ ≤ C2 (< C1 < TC2). Then ΠIPM4 −ΠT > 0 if
∆ k
ψ
< C1
1− PL (1− PH)
1− PL (1− PH)− PL [1 + 2 (1− PH)(PH − PL)] . (37)
The denominator on the RHS is positive since
PL (1− PH)− PL [1 + 2 (1− PH)(PH − PL)] = 1− PL (2− PH) + 2 (1− PH)(PH − PL)
> 1− PL (2− PH) > (1− PH)2 > 0,
and it clearly is smaller than the numerator. Hence, the expression on the RHS of (37)
is larger than C1 and the condition is satisfied.
• C2 ≤ ∆ kψ < C1.
IPM4 is not renegotiation proof.
2. IMP6 dominates T whenever IPM4 is not renegotiation proof
Two case need to be considered:
• C2 ≤ C5 ≤ ∆ kψ < C1 (< TC2). Then we have ΠIPM6 = qˆ > ΠT .
• C2 ≤ ∆ kψ < C1 < C5. Then, ΠIPM6 −ΠT > 0 if
∆ k
ψ
<
(2− PH − PL) [1− (1− PH) (PL + PH)]
2 (1− PH) [1− PL (2− PH − PL)]
1
PL (1− PH) . (38)
The expression on the RHS being greater than C1, the condition is satisfied. Indeed, we
have that 1PL (1−PH) > C1 and the remaining fraction is larger than one since
(2− PH − PL) [1− (1− PH) (PL + PH)]− 2 (1− PH) [1− PL (2− PH − PL)]
= (PH − PL) [2PH − 1 + PL (1− PH) + PH (1− PH)] > 0 (since PH > 12).
F Proof of Proposition 4
1. RPM1 dominates IPM6.
RPM1 qHh
θ = H
qHl
qLh [(t1,m1), (t1,m1)] [(t1,m1), (0,m2)]
θ = L
qLl [(0,m2), (t1,m1)] [(0,m3), (0,m3)]
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Given that both agents exert effort under RPM1, beliefs about the agents’ types are:
E [kθ| t1,m1] = PH kH + PL kL
PH + PL
, (39)
E [kθ| 0,m2] = PL (1− PH) kH + PH (1− PL) kL
PH + PL − 2PHPL , (40)
E [kθ| 0,m3] = kH + kL2 . (41)
The high-skilled agent’s incentive constraint requires that
t1 ≥ t¯ ≡ ψ
PH
− (PH − PL)
(
PH + PL + P 2L − PHPL
)
2 (PH + PL) (PH + PL − 2PHPL) ∆ k. (IC : H)
Similarly, the low-skilled agent’s incentive constraint requires that
t1 ≥ t ≡ ψ
PL
− (PH − PL)
(
PH + PL + P 2H − PHPL
)
2 (PH + PL) (PH + PL − 2PHPL) ∆ k. (IC : L)
Note that t¯ > t if and only if ∆ kψ >
2 (PH+PL−2PHPL)
PHPL(PH−PL) ≡ C6.
Together, the incentive and wealth constraints imply that t1 ≥ max {t, t¯, 0 } . We
have that t > 0 if and only if ∆ kψ <
2 (PH+PL)(PH+PL−2PHPL)
PL(PH−PL)(PH+PL+P 2H−PHPL)
≡ C7 and t¯ >
0 if and only if ∆ kψ <
2 (PH+PL)(PH+PL−2PHPL)
PH(PH−PL)(PH+PL+P 2L−PHPL)
≡ C8. Conveniently, C6 >
C7 > C8, since C6 − C7 = 2 (PH+PL−2PH PL)
2
PL PH (PH−PL)(PH+PL+P 2H−PHPL)
> 0 and C7 − C8 =
2 (PH+PL)(PH+PL−2PHPL)2
PHPL (PH+PL+P 2L−PHPL)(PH+PL+P 2H−PHPL)
> 0. Hence,
t1 =

ψ
PL
− (PH−PL)(PH+PL+P
2
H−PHPL)
2 (PH+PL)(PH+PL−2PHPL) ∆ k if
∆ k
ψ < C7,
0 otherwise.
(42)
The contract is renegotiation proof if and only if for ∆ kψ < C7 we have that t1 +
E [kθ| t1,m1] > max {E [kθ| 0,m2] , E [kθ| 0,m3]}. Note that E [kθ| 0,m3] − E [kθ| 0,m2] =
PH−PL
2 (PH−PL−2PL PH) ∆ k > 0. Moreover, t1 + E [kθ| t1,m1] − E [kθ| 0,m3] =
ψ
PL
−
PH (PH−PL)
2 (PH+PL−2PHPL) ∆ k. This expression is positive if
∆ k
ψ <
2 (PH+PL−2PHPL)
PHPL(PH−PL) ≡ C9. Hence,
renegotiation proofness follows from C9 − C7 = 2 (PH+PL−2PL PH)
2
PH PL (PH−PL)(PH+PL+P 2H−PL PH)
> 0.
Using the above results, the expected profit is given by:
ΠRPM3 =
 qˆ −
PL+PH
PL
ψ +
(PH−PL)(PH+PL+P 2H−PHPL)
2 (PH+PL−2PHPL) ∆ k if
∆ k
ψ < C7,
qˆ otherwise.
(43)
Comparing this profit with that of IPM6 a useful result is that
C5 − C7 = (PH + PL)
2 (1− PH)
PL
(
PH + PL + P 2H − PHPL
) ≥ 0. (44)
This leaves the following cases to be considered:
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• ∆ kψ < C7, then ΠRPM1 −ΠIPM6 = (PH−PL)
2(PH+PL)(1−PH)
2 (PH+PL−2PHPL)(2−PH−PL) ∆ k > 0.
• C7 ≤ ∆ kψ < C5, then ΠRPM1−ΠIPM6 = PL+PHPL ψ−
PH−PL
2−PH−PL ∆ k > 0, since
∆ k
ψ < C5.
• C5 ≤ ∆ kψ , then ΠRPM1 −ΠIPM6 = 0.
It now remains to show that RPM1 strictly dominates IPM6 whenever the latter is the best
IPM contract. First notice that IPM6 has zero implementation cost and therefore is an optimal
contract (i.e., cannot be beaten strictly by any other contract) if ∆ kψ ≥ C5. Similarly, RPM1
is an optimal contract if ∆ kψ ≥ C7. Hence, we can potentially beat all IPM contracts in the
range [C7, C5). Now, let us remind the reader that
1. IPM5 is not renegotiation proof if ∆ kψ ≥ C4.
2. IPM4 is not renegotiation proof if C2 < ∆ kψ < C1 (implying that PH > 1/2).
Hence, IPM6 is the best renegotiation-proof IPM but not (necessarily) an optimal contract if
max{C2, C4} < ∆ k
ψ
< min{C1, C5}. (45)
We can loosen this condition taking into account that C1 > C2 implies that PH > 12 and then
C4 ≥ C2 (see footnote 25). Therefore, RPM1 is an optimal contract while IPM6, which is the
best IPM contract, does not attain the same profit if
max{C4, C7} < ∆ k
ψ
< min{C1, C5}. (46)
The interval in (46) is non-empty for a non-degenerate range of parameter values. It can be
shown that there exists a non-degenerate range of parameter values for which C1 > C5 (e.g.,
if PL ∈ [0, PH) and PH ∈ [PL, 0.75)). Moreover,
• C5 > C7 (see equation (44) above).
• C5 − C4 = PL (1−PH)+PL (1−PL)(PH−PL) (1−PL) > 0.
Thus, if C5 = min{C1, C5} it follows that the interval in condition (46) is non-empty.
2. RPM2 yields the same profit as IPM5.
RPM2 qHh
θ = H
qHl
qLh [(t2,m2), (t1,m1)] [(t4,m4), (0,m3)]
θ = L
qLl [(0,m3), (t1,m1)] [(0,m3), (0,m3)]
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We start off with the transfers from the IPM5 contract, which has the following structure:
[(ta,ma), (tb,mb), (tcd,mcd)]. It can be shown that27
ta =

ψ
PH
− (1−PL)2−PH−PL ∆ k if ∆ kψ <
2−PH−PL
PH(1−PL) ≡ C3,
0 otherwise,
(47)
tb =
ψ
PL
+
(1− PH)
2− PH − PL ∆ k, (48)
tcd = 0. (using lemma 3) (49)
The conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied if and only if ∆ kψ <
2−PH−PL
PL(1−PL) ≡ C4.
Using the transfers under IPM5 above, set the transfers for the candidate RPM2 contract
as follows: t1 = ta, t2 = tb + η and t4 = tb − PH1−PH η. Moreover, m1 6= m2 6= m3 6= m4.
This leaves the reputation effects and the principal’s expected profit under RPM2 as under
IPM5. Obviously, since C4 > C3 an η ∈ R exists for all parameter values so that RPM2 is
renegotiation proof whenever IPM5 is renegotiation proof.
3. RPM3 (generically) yields the same profit as IPM4.
RPM3 qHh
θ = H
qHl
qLh [(t1,m1), (t2,m2)] [(t1,m1), (t1,m1)]
θ = L
qLl [(0,m4), (t3,m3)] [(0,m4), (t1,m1)]
We start off with the transfers from the IPM4 contract, which has the following structure:
[(ta,ma), (tbc,mbc), (td,md)]. It can be shown that28
tbc =

ψ
PL
− (1−PH)1+PL−PH ∆ k if ∆ kψ < C1,
not renegotiation proof if PH > 12 and C2 <
∆ k
ψ < C1,
0 if ∆ kψ ≥ max {C1, C2} ,
(50)
and
ta =

PH+PL
PLPH
ψ −∆ k if PH ≤
1
2 and
∆ k
ψ < C1,
or PH > 12 and
∆ k
ψ ≤ C2,
ψ
PH
− PL1+PL−PH ∆ k if PH ≤ 12 and C1 ≤ ∆ kψ < C2,
not renegotiation proof if PH > 12 and C2 <
∆ k
ψ < C1,
0 if ∆ kψ ≥ max {C1, C2} .
(51)
27This is implicit in the profits given in Table 3. The detailed derivations underlying the table are available
from the authors.
28This is implicit in the profits given in Table 3. The detailed derivations underlying the table are available
from the authors.
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Using the transfers under IPM4 defined above, set the transfers for the candidate RPM3
contract as follows: t1 = tbc, t2 = t3 = 0 if ta = 0. Otherwise set t2 = ta+η and t3 = ta− PL1−PL η.
Moreover,m1 6= m2 6= m3 6= m4. This leaves the reputation effects and the principal’s expected
profit under RPM3 as under IPM4. Such a η ∈ R+ exists for all parameter values and leads
to a renegotiation proof RPM contract whenever IPM4 is renegotiation proof, except for the
combination of parameter values PH = 12 and
∆ k
ψ = C1 ≡ 1+PL−PHPL(1−PH) = C2 ≡
1+PL−PH
PHPL
. In this
case, both transfers used in IPM4 are equal to zero, i.e., ta = tbc = 0, and therefore IPM4 is
renegotiation proof. However, since transfers cannot be negative, RPM3 is not feasible in this
non-generic point of the parameter space.
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